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One of the most important result in Heckscher-Ohlin models of international trade, the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, predicts that when a country opens up to international trade, the rewards to
the factor of production in which it is relatively abundant should increase, relative to the reward
of other factors. This prediction has been conrmed in a number of unskilled labor-abundant
\early globalizers" (such as Italy, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan) where trade has increased
the unskilled wage relative to the skilled wage (thus decreasing the skill premium). However in
the case of unskilled labor-abundant countries that have globalized in the 1980s and 1990s (such
as most of Latin America, India and Hong Kong), trade seems to have induced an increase in
the skill premium, rather than a reduction.1
This fact, sometimes called the \skill premium puzzle" has attracted a fair bit of attention.
In particular, the trade literature has sought to re-concile the Latin American experience with
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO from now on) theory by arguing that trade liberalization aected dispro-
portionally unskilled labor-intensive industries (Revenga, 1997), or that countries such as China,
Indonesia and Pakistan made the world outside Latin America actually unskilled labor-intensive
(Davis, 1996; Wood, 1999). In these contexts, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem would correctly
predict an increase in the skill premium in Latin America. The problem with these interpreta-
tions is that they rely on inter-sectoral movements toward skill-intensive sectors to explain the
increase in the skill premium, and they predict that skill intensity should have decreased across
sectors in Latin America. Both of these predictions have not been conrmed in the data.2 In
response to these shortcomings, much of the literature has turned to non-trade explanations for
the increase in the skill premium in Latin America, most notably skill biased technical change.3
1This has been documented my micro studies of at least 7 countries: Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina,
Brazil, India and Hong Kong. See the survey by Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for more details.
2For example, Wacziarg and Wallack (2004) nd little evidence of labor re-allocation across sectors following to
trade liberalization in a sample of 20 countries. For Mexico, Verhoogen (2008) nds evidence of labor re-location
towards unskilled labor-intensive industries. See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007, p. 59) for a list of empirical papers
nding that skill intensity has increased across most industries in Latin America.
3There are two important exceptions to this. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) study the impact of trade liberaliza-
tion when this is associated with signicant outsourcing ows from North to South. They nd that this specic
type of liberalization may increase the skill premium in both countries. Verhoogen (2008) builds a \new" trade
model where rms dier in productivity and quality of production, and shows that quality upgrading following
to trade liberalization may result in a higher relative white-collar wage and higher sectoral wage inequality.
2In this paper, we show how to re-concile a standard HO model of trade liberalization between
an unskilled labor-abundant South and a skill labor-abundant North with an increase of the skill
premium in both North and South. We do so by drawing on the literature on trade liberalization
and human capital accumulation in the presence of credit constraints (which we review in detail
at the end of this section). This has convincingly argued that trade may increase human capital
accumulation, by weakening the credit constraints of the poor and thus improving their access to
the education system. We show that when this is the case, trade may improve the allocation of
talent to the skilled labor force, both in the short and in the long run. This compositional eect
generates an upward pressure on the observed skilled wage, which can well be strong enough
to overturn the Stolper-Samuelson prediction of a lower skill premium in South following to
trade liberalization. While reconciling the Stolper-Samuelson theorem with the Latin American
experience, our model preserves the other main features of standard HO theory - namely, that
all industries in South become more skill intensive after trade liberalization, and that there is
inter-sectoral movements towards unskilled labor-intensive industries. Importantly, however, we
argue that the mechanism would survive if we allowed for labor market frictions (such as a high
cost of ring) to slow down the inter-sectoral reallocation of labor.4
Our mechanism works as follows. Because of capital market imperfections, young agents
cannot borrow to pay for their subsistence while attending school. Thus, only those whose
parents have a high wage can possibly go to school. In an economy with little human capital,
the cost of subsistence is very high relative to the wage of unskilled workers. This creates one
equilibrium in which there are few skilled workers, the skilled wage is high, and all and only the
ospring of skilled workers go to school. With heterogeneous talent, this equilibrium is \bad" in
eciency terms, in that many talented ospring of unskilled workers are prevented from going
to school while many ospring of skilled workers go to school despite being non talented. This
compares with a \good" equilibrium in which there are many skilled workers, the skilled wage is
low, and all and only the talented workers go to school independently on their social origins.
We consider an economy that is skill-scarce because it is stuck at the bad equilibrium, and
4Rigid labor market have been indicated as one of the main reasons why labor reallocation to comparative
advantage industries has been very slow in many countries, see for example Kambourov (2009).
3study its reaction to the liberalization of trade with an economy that, being at the good equilib-
rium, is skill-abundant. By putting a downward pressure on the skilled wage, trade may induce
many non-talented skilled workers to drop out of the skilled labor force. At the same time, it
reduces the cost of subsistence for unskilled workers, thus making it easier for their ospring to
go to school. Because many of these previously-excluded agents are high talent, they may still
nd it optimal to join the skilled labor force despite the trade-induced drop in the skilled wage.
These two eects may move the economy from its initial equilibrium to the good equilibrium,
thus increasing the average quality of the skilled labor force. This creates an upward force on the
average observed skill premium, that can more than compensate the negative eect of trade on
the skilled wage. Thus, while the skill premium always increases in the skill-abundant economy,
it may increase in the skill-scarce country as well, both in the short run and in the long run.
Although trade disappears in this model in the long run, we argue that our results are robust
to allowing for more \structural" sources of comparative advantage, such as cross-country dier-
ences in the quality of the education system. Our results suggests that the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem needs to be modied in the context of imperfect credit markets, to account for the
possibility of compositional changes in the skilled labor force.
The literature on trade with capital market imperfections is now quite large. An important
part of it has focused on how comparative advantage and the pattern of trade are determined
by cross country heterogeneity in the eciency of capital markets (see for example Kletzer and
Bardhan, 1987; Wynne, 2005; and Manova, 2008). Although our result is compatible with
the idea that comparative advantage in the export of skill-intensive products may be driven
by dierent capital market development, the focus of our paper is dierent. More connected
to our paper is the literature on trade liberalization and occupational choice, in the presence
of credit market frictions. Starting with the seminal work by Cartiglia (1997), this literature
has shown that, by lessening credit constraints, trade may induce an increase in human capital
accumulation in both the skill intensive North and in the non skill-intensive South. This result
is in contrast with the classical literature on this topic,5 and can help explain a rapid increase
in capital accumulation in the early East Asian globalizers and, to a lesser extent, in Latin
5See Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Stokey (1991).
4America. Among the various papers in this literature, the closest to our own is Ranjan (2003).6
Although our mechanism has much in common with the mechanism proposed in this paper, one
key dierence stands out: while Ranjan (2003) nds that trade has a standard Stolper-Samuelson
eect on relative wages, we show that, if talent is positively correlated with productivity, trade
may result in an increase in the skill premium in both North and South.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our basic economic model. We make
a series of modeling choices that keep the model extremely simple, even after building on it in
subsequent sections. In Section 3 we endogeneize the schooling decisions of agents, and their
participation in the skilled labor force. We then summarize the timing of our model 4 and solve
for the autarchy equilibrium 5. Our main results are contained in Section 6, where we open
up the economy to trade with a skill-intensive county and study the consequences on the skill
premium. In Section 7 we conclude.
2 The Model
Consider the case of a \Home" country (H) where two tradable intermediate goods, x and y,
are produced using skilled and unskilled labor. Production of x is relatively unskilled labor-








where  < 1
2. The two intermediate goods are assembled into a non tradable nal good z, also






6Eicher (1999), Ranjan (2001a), Das (2006), and Chesnokova and Krishna (2009) are some of the other
important contributions in this literature.
7The paper is also related to the literature on trade, credit constraints and child labor, see in particular Ranjan
(2001b).
5where A is total factor productivity in the z sector. There is also another non tradable nal
good f in this economy, produced with constant return to scale and using unskilled labor only
(f = U). To x ideas, we may think of f as products and services typical of the \traditional"
economy (e.g. subsistence agriculture; constructions; retail trade; simple business services) and
of z as services of the \modern" economy (e.g. utilities; telecommunications; nancial services;
health care). In this context, x could represent materials and basic manufactures, while y could
represent more complex machines (such as computers).8
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents, each containing a continuum
of agents with mass n. Agents live for two periods. We will call \generation t" the generation
born in period t. In her second period of life, each member of generation t gives birth to exactly
one agent of generation t+1. This ensures that, in any given period, there is a mass 2n of agents.
Agents have identical preferences. In each period of life, agent i from generation t obtains








where s = t;t + 1 denotes whether the agent is in the rst or second period of life, and  is a
parameter. We assume that  is small enough, so that all agents can aord to spend  on good
z. This will imply that good f will always be produced, both in autarchy and in the free trade
equilibrium.10
In their second period of life, agents also care about the bequest they leave to their ospring.















t denotes the bequest (in terms of utility) left by the agent to her ospring. We assume
8Notice that we don't strictly need z to be non tradable; however this simplies the description of the trade
equilibrium.
9Our results are robust to using other functional forms from the widely-used class u = f + v(z), where v(:) is
dierentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. The choice v(:) = log(:) simplies the calculations, however, by
ensuring that expenditure on good z is xed.
10More details on this are provided in sections 3.2 and Appendix B.
6that there is a \survival constraint", in the sense that if an agent's per-period consumption utility
falls below a threshold u in any of the two periods, this agents dies of starvation. We capture











Notice that, in both periods, the marginal utility of income is constant and equal to 1 when
the survival constraint does not bind.11 In this context, the role of the survival constraint is to
introduce a decreasing marginal utility of income at a single point of the income distribution.
As will be clear in section 3.2, this will allow us to model the impact of credit constraints in a
very tractable way.
Finally, we assume that goods are perishable, and there are no nancial markets. Thus,
income cannot be transferred across periods.
2.1 Equilibrium with exogenous labor supply
Suppose that, in some period t, the supply of skilled and unskilled labor is xed, and that skilled





A competitive equilibrium of this economy consists of an unskilled salary (w), a skilled salary
(v), two prices of the intermediate goods (px and py), and two prices of the nal goods (pz and
pf) such that these markets clear, given that all agents behave optimally. We normalize the
unskilled wage to 1. Since good f is always produced in equilibrium, the zero-prot condition in
11A low  - the optimal expense on good z - ensure that the marginal utility of income is 1 in the rst period.
The equal power on bi
t and ui
t;t+1 and the discount factor on second-period utility ensure that the marginal utility
of income is constant and equal to 1 in the second period as well (see Appendix E for more details). Notice that
to allow for more general functional forms would have greatly complicated the math without undermining the
logic of the argument.
12Only parents can work as skilled in this model, see section 3.
7the f industry implies that pf = 1. To simplify the notation, we rename the price of z to simply
p. Summing up, we have: w  1 which implies pf = 1; and pz  p:
We can then denote a competitive equilibrium of this economy as a vector of prices [v;px;py;p]
such that all markets clear, given that all agents behave optimally. In what follows, we will denote
by [vt;(px)t;(py)t;pt] the competitive equilibrium in period t. It turns out that the competitive
equilibrium is straightforward to derive. Because pz = 1 and  is low enough, all agents allocate
expenditure  to good z. This implies that total revenues in the z sector will be 2n, and total
revenues in the x and y sector n each. As skilled labor receives a share  of revenues in the x
sector and a share 1    of revenues in the y sector, the total reward to skilled labor is also n.
But equilibrium in the skilled labor market then requires that
n





It is then easy to derive the equilibrium prices in all industries using the relevant zero-prot
condition. We report here only the nal expressions for (px)t, (py)t and pt, presenting the

















where b   (1   )1 . Equation (1) illustrates the simplicity and tractability of the economic
model that we have chosen to use. In any period t, the equilibrium skilled wage is only a function
of the contemporary stock of skilled labor. Furthermore, it is a linear function of the inverse of
the share of skilled labor in the population of parents. In the next sections, we will show how this
simple economic framework may provide a very convenient building block of a dynamic trade
model with endogenous schooling decisions and aggregate human capital accumulation.
83 Schooling
All agents are endowed with one unit of time in each period, and are born unskilled. In their rst
period of life, they can choose whether to use their time to work as unskilled, or to go to school.
If they work, they can only work as unskilled in their second period. If they go to school, on
the contrary, they become \educated" and acquire the option of working as skilled in the second
period. Educated parents retain the option to work as unskilled in the second period. Thus,
there may be three distinct groups of parents in any period t: non educated parents, educated
parents that work as skilled, and educated parents that work as unskilled.
Agents dier in their level of talent, . For simplicity, talent can take only two values,  = 1
and  =  > 1. We will say that an agent is \non talented" when she has talent 1, while it is
\talented" when she has talent . We assume that talent is not inherited, but that is distributed
randomly across the population with a probability of observing a talented agent equal to . Thus,
each generation has a mass n of talented agents and a mass (1   )n of non talented agents,
and the average talent in the population is:
b    + 1   :
While all agents are equally productive when they work as unskilled, there is a one-to-one
mapping between an agent's level of talent and its productivity as a skilled worker. In other
words, a non talented worker can only contribute 1 eciency unit of skilled labor, while a talented
worker can contribute  units. This maps into a higher salary awarded by a competitive skilled
labor market to talented agents (who receive v) than to non talented agents (who receive v).
While in what follows we continue to refer to v as to the skilled wage, it should be born in mind
that what this symbol really indicates is the skilled wage of non-talented agents, or the skilled
wage per eciency unit.
93.1 Participation constraints
We assume that school is free of charge, as would be the case of a country where education is
fully subsidized by the government.13 Despite being free, however, school comes at the cost of a
lost unskilled wage in the agent's rst period of life. When choosing whether to go to school or
not, agents compare this cost to the dierence in salary that they can expect to receive working
as skilled workers in their second period of life. Since agents with dierent levels of talent can
expect to receive dierent skilled wages, they will also have dierent participation constraints.
Given that the marginal utility of income is constant and equal in the two periods, we can write
generation t's participation constraints as follows:
v
e
t+1 > 2 (5)
v
e
t+1 > 2 (6)
where ve
t+1 is the expected equilibrium skilled wage at period t+1. Notice that it always ex-post
optimal for an educated agent to work as skilled in period t + 1, provided that her expectations
in period t were correct. This is clear from the fact that the ex-post participation constraints
of the two types are vt+1 > 1 and vt+1 > 1, which are always satised if (5) and (6) hold and
vt+1 = ve
t+1. Intuitively, the cost of education is sunk in period t+1, while the agent's productivity
is unchanged. Rational initial decisions must then be optimal, unless external conditions have
changed.
3.2 Credit constraints
Under the assumption that credit markets do not exist, we now move to consider how the school-
ing decisions of agents are driven not only by income maximization (as described in equations
5 and 6), but also by parental wealth. While school is free of charge, agents can only aord to
go to school if their bequest is high enough to cover their subsistence expense while in school. If
this is not the case, agents must join the unskilled labor force and pay for their own subsistence
expense, or else die out of starvation. Thus, the distribution of bequests determines which young
13This is only a simplifying assumption; see section 3.2 for further discussion of this point.
10agents can aord to go to school, and which one cannot. We will refer to the latter group as the
credit constrained young agents.14 This way of modeling educational credit constraints is in line
with abundant empirical evidence suggesting that a major force keeping the poor out of school is
the high opportunity cost from lost labor opportunities, given their proximity to the subsistence
level of income.15
We now proceed to study the shape of the distribution of bequests, and its impacts on
the schooling decisions of agents. In any period t, parents can fall into three income brackets,
depending on whether they work as unskilled (income 1), skilled being non talented (income v),
or skilled being talented (income v). Because educated parents are free to choose whether to
work in the skilled or unskilled labor force, income in the two latter brackets cannot fall below 1
in equilibrium. Thus, the minimum bequest that is transferred in period t is 1
2, which is what the
ospring of unskilled workers receive. For any  < 1
2, it is then indeed the case that all agents
can aord to spend  on good f.16
These agents are the rst to become credit constrained when the cost of achieving the sub-
sistence level of utility increases. Specically, for these agents not to be credit constrained in





where e(u;pt) is the consumer's expenditure function valued at the subsistence level of utility
and at current prices (notice that we can omit the price of z from the expression, as this is
14The literature introduces educational credit constraints in two ways. On one hand, some papers assume a
constant marginal utility of income and a schooling fee that depends on the skilled wage (e.g. Cartiglia, 1997).
On the other, a few other papers assume a decreasing marginal utility of income (e.g. Ranjan, 2003). Our paper
belongs to the latter group, with the innovation that the marginal utility of income is assumed to be innite at
the subsistence level of utility, nite and constant above that level (more on this below). A constant marginal
utility of income for all surviving agents (for all agents) oers obvious modeling advantages. We stress, however,
that our results do not hinge on the specic way in which we introduce educational credit constraints.
15For example, Cartwright (1999) argue that Colombian boys become increasingly likely to drop out of school
as they grow older, as their opportunity cost from lost labor opportunities increases. He also nd that a 1%
increase in household expenditure map into a .11% (.19%) lower probability of work for a rural (urban) child.
Cartwright and Patrinos (1999) nd similar results for urban Bolivia. In both cases, there is also evidence that the
existence of household assets decrease the probability of work, witnessing to the importance of credit constraints
for schooling decisions.
16This ensures that good f is produced in autarchy, since total income must be higher than total revenues in
the z sector.
11always unity). When condition (7) does not hold, the ospring of unskilled workers must work
as unskilled in the rst period of her life, or else die from starvation.
The consumer's expenditure function is straightforward to derive. Importantly, we can focus
on that portion of the expenditure function that takes value around the threshold 1
2: since
 < 1
2 by assumption, and  is the optimal expenditure on good z, the relevant portion of the
expenditure function is the one at which consumption of good z is at its optimum (

pt). Since
the utility from consuming this amount of z is log
2
pt , the relevant portion of the expenditure
function is simply:




That is, the cost of achieving utility u is given by the cost of the optimal consumption of z
(), augmented by the cost of increasing utility from log
2
pt to u through consumption of f. We
can now re-write the expenditure function in terms of vt by plugging in (4):




where F(u;A)   + u   log
2b A
2 . Not surprisingly, the cost of subsistence is always strictly
increasing in v - a measure of the scarcity of skilled labor in the economy, and thus the cost of
producing z. Moreover, the cost of subsistence takes value in ( 1;1) for vt in (0;1). Plugging
(8) into (7), we obtain:
vt  expf1   2F(u;A)g  vcc: (9)
Inequality (9) denes a threshold for the current skilled wage that is critical to determine
whether the ospring of unskilled agents are credit constrained or not. In particular, if vt  vcc
the ospring of unskilled agents are not credit constrained, while they are if vt > vcc. Intuitively,
a increase in vt (that is, a scarcer skilled labor force) is associated with a high cost of production
in the z sector, a higher pt, and a higher subsistence cost (recall that e(u;p) is increasing in
p). For the ospring of unskilled workers, this increase in subsistence cost is not matched by an
increase in bequest, which is only linked to the unskilled wage. Thus, a high enough vt implies
that the ospring of unskilled agents must work as unskilled in the rst period of their life to
12meet their subsistence needs. Not surprisingly, the threshold vcc is always increasing in A, the
total factor productivity in the z sector. Intuitively, a more productive economy makes the cost
of subsistence smaller for any existing stock of skilled labor, thus reducing the probability that
the ospring of unskilled workers are credit constrained. In fact, we can always set A large
enough so that vt  vcc, and credit constraints are not an issue for this group of agents.
We have thus determined that a high skilled wage may be bad news for the ospring of
unskilled workers, in that it may force them to remain in the unskilled labor force as well. But
how about the credit constraints of the ospring of skilled workers? As we have already noticed,
these agents must be at least as wealthy as the ospring of unskilled workers in equilibrium.
Thus, if the latter are not credit constrained in equilibrium (it is vt  vcc), nor can the ospring
of skilled workers be. If the ospring of unskilled workers are credit constrained (it is vt > vcc),
we show in Appendix C that a sucient condition for the ospring of skilled workers not to
be credit constrained is that vcc > 1
. Intuitively, a high enough vt must be good news for the
ospring of skilled workers: this is because the bequest that these agents receive is linear in vt,
while the cost of subsistence is concave. It must then be the case that the former overtake the
latter for vt higher than a certain threshold. The condition vcc > 1
 makes sure that this threshold
be lower than vcc, implying that the ospring of skilled workers will never be credit constrained
for vt > vcc. Since we will anyway want to restrict our attention to cases in which vcc is high
(and higher than 1
, see Section 5), we can safely conclude that the ospring of skilled workers
will never be credit constrained in equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper, we will study how a trade-induced decrease in vt may lead to a
relaxation in the credit constraints of the ospring of unskilled workers. In this context, the
results derived above may be seen as a corollary of the classic 2x2x2 Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
This states that a trade-induced rise in the relative price of a good raises the real return of the
factor used intensively in the production of that good, and lowers the real return of the other
factor, in terms of both goods in the economy. In our model, trade will increase the price of good
x, thus increasing the real return to unskilled labor in terms of both x and y (and thus z). This
will then result into a lower cost of subsistence for the ospring of unskilled workers, relaxing
their credit constraints.
13Notice that the existence of a subsistence level of utility must put a constraint on the minimum
endowment of productive factors in an economy. In this model with human capital accumulation,
this requires to rule out that there are too few educated agents at any point in time. To see this,
notice that if e(u;p) > 1 the unskilled workers are never able to reach the subsistence level of
utility - not even if they leave no bequest to their ospring. Thus, all unskilled workers would
pass away in this case, and the economy would collapse. To avoid this, we must impose the
following:
v < argfe(u;p) = 1g
= vcc  expf1g
 v:
Notice that it is always vcc < v. Furthermore, being a linear function of vcc, v depends on
A just as vcc does. In what follow, we will only consider the case in which the economy never
collapses, or in which vt < v at all periods. This will only require to impose some restrictions
on initial conditions, as vt < v will then emerge naturally from the agents' schooling decisions
under the model's assumptions.
4 Timing and equilibrium concepts
The following events take place in each period t:
t.1 Generation t is born from parents of generation t   1;
t.2 Educated parents decide whether to work as skilled or unskilled. At the same time, gener-
ation t decide whether to join the unskilled labor force or go to school.
t.3 Production takes place; all markets clear.
t.4 Bequests are transferred, consumption takes place.
t.5 Parents pass away.
14Just as in section 2, a competitive equilibrium at time t is dened as a vector of prices
[vt;(pt)x;(pt)y;pt] such that all markets clear, given that all agents behave optimally and a positive
amount of good f is produced. It is important to notice that, with endogenous schooling and
working decision, this denition includes two additional requirements of an optimal behavior of
agents. First, the schooling decisions of young agents in t   1 (and thus the supply of educated
parents in t) must be optimal given the prices that realize in t. We consider this to be a feature
of period t's equilibrium (rather than period t   1's) because schooling decisions in t   1 only
aect prices in t.17 Second, the working decisions of educated parents at time t (and thus the
supply of skilled labor in t) must also be optimal given the prices in t. To distinguish it from
a dierent equilibrium concept that we shall introduce shortly, we will refer to this equilibrium
concept as to the short-run equilibrium in period t.
While the short-run equilibrium in period t is never aected by the short-run equilibrium in
period t + 1, it may well be aected by the short-run equilibrium in period t   1. To illustrate
this, it is useful to consider a specic parametric specication where this \path dependency" does
not take place, and then contrast it with a more general specication of the model. Suppose that
u !  1, so that e(u;pt 1) ! 0. In this case, no agents is ever credit constrained, and schooling
decisions at time t 1 are only aected by expected prices at time t: in other words, the short-run
equilibrium at time t is not aected by any conditions prevailing at any previous time. Suppose
now that e(u;pt 1) > 0. In this case, the ospring of unskilled agents will be credit constrained
for v > vcc. Thus schooling decisions at time t 1 (and the short run equilibrium at time t) will
be aected by the level of prices at time t   1 (or by the short-run equilibrium at time t   1).
Whenever the model displays path dependency, it is interesting to dene a concept of long-
run equilibrium to clarify which dierent short-term equilibria may become persistent over time.
We will then say that a \long-run equilibrium " is formed at time t whenever the short-term
equilibrium realizing at time t is identical to the short-term equilibria realizing at times t + s,
were s = 1;:::;1. That is, in a long run equilibrium all generations make the same schooling
and occupational choices, and prices remain constant over time.
17This important feature of the model relies on the fact that good f is always produced, and the relative wage
does not depend on the amount of unskilled workers in the economy.
15Having dened our equilibrium concept, we now move to describing the autarchy equilibrium
of country H.
5 Autarchy equilibrium
We begin by making two assumptions on the distribution of talent and on the level of credit
constraints in the economy:






Assumption 2 vcc > 2.
Assumption 1 requires that the number of talented agents in the population be \intermedi-
ate", where the lower bound of the allowed range is decreasing in the ratio of the high level of
talent to the low level of talent (). As will be clear below, this assumption is merely useful to
simplify the description of the equilibrium, given the discreteness of the distribution of talent.
Assumption 2 requires that productivity in the economy be high enough, so that the threshold
above which the ospring of unskilled agents are credit constrained be not too small. This as-
sumption is necessary to make sure that there exists an equilibrium in which the talented agents
are not credit constraints. This is the interesting case for us, as it is the one in which trade may
lead to a better allocation of talent in H, thus aecting the skill premium in a non-standard
way. Notice also that assumptions 1 and 2 together imply that vcc > 1
, and we are then safe
to assume that the ospring of skilled workers are never credit constrained in equilibrium (see
section 3.2).
We are now ready to describe the long-run autarchy equilibrium of country H. For concise-
ness, we only report the equilibrium schooling decisions of agents and the equilibrium skilled
wage:
Proposition 1 From any (feasible) initial stock of educated parents in t = 0, the economy
converges to a unique long-run equilibrium no later than t = 3. Depending on the initial stock,
this can be:
16 A \good equilibrium" in which v =

, and all and only the talented agents go to school.
 One from a continuum of \bad equilibria" in which v 2 (vcc;v] >

, and all and only the
ospring of skilled workers go to school.
Proof. Denote by at and bt the number of talented and non talented agents that go to school
in generation t (as a share of the total number of agents in generation t). Furthermore, dene
et  at + bt. We then focus on period t = 1 and show that, for any feasible initial conditions
a0;b0, the economy converges to one of the two types of long-run equilibria no later than t = 3.
Feasibility of initial conditions requires that a0 + b0 >

v, so that v1  v (since v > 1 by
assumption, all educated parents will join the skilled labor force before this high level of the
skilled wage is reached). We can then distinguish two cases: v1  vcc and v1 2 (vcc;v]. If
v1  vcc, no agent is credit constrained, and schooling decisions in period 1 maximise lifetime
income given an expected skilled salary in period 2 (ve
2). With rational expectations and certainty,
it is always optimal for an agent who has gone to school in t = 1 to work as skilled in t = 2.
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b  if 2 < ve
2  v
(10)
Which is continuous and monotonically increasing in ve
2. In every period, the demand for skilled
labor (expressed as a share of the population of parents) is continuous and monotonically de-
creasing in the current skilled salary, sd(v) =

v (for v  v). Furthermore, it is sd(0) > ss
2(0) and
sd(v) < ss
2(v). With rational expectations, we can substitute v2 (the equilibrium skilled salary at
t = 2) for ve
2 in ss
2(:), and solve for the unique v2 2 (0;v) and s2 (the equilibrium stock of skilled
labor at t = 2) by equating demand and supply, ss
2(v2) = sd(v2). By Assumption 1, sd(2
) > 
and sd(2) < ; this makes sure that s2 =  and v2 =

. By Assumption 2,

 < vcc, making
17sure that ss
3(:) = ss
2(:). Since sd(:) is the same at all times, the short-run equilibrium at t = 3
is identical to that at t = 2. Since this can be said for all t = 3;4;:::;1, we have shown that a
long-run equilibrium is achieved in t = 2, whereby st =  and vt =

 for all t = 2;:::;1.
If v1 2 (vcc;v], all ospring of unskilled workers are credit constrained. This implies that the
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e0b  if 2 < ve
2  v
(11)
Which is again continuous and monotonically increasing in ve
2, but lies always below (10) (except
for the case in which e0 = 1, where the two schedules are identical). Since sd(:) is the same
as before, it will then be v2 

. Feasibility of initial conditions requires that b e0 

v, so
that v2  v (notice that for at least some values of a0 and b0 this is a stricter requirement than
a0 +b0 

v). We can then distinguish two cases, v2 2 (

;vcc] and v2 2 (vcc;v]. If v2 2 (

;vcc],
the economy converges to the good equilibrium in period 3 (by the same logic used above). If
v2 2 (vcc;v] it must be that ss
3 = ss
2, since e1 = e0 (recall that vcc > 2 by assumption; then, all
ospring of skilled workers must have gone to school in t = 1). Since sd is the same at all times,
the short run equilibrium at t = 3 is identical to that at t = 2. Since this can be said for all
t = 3;4;:::;1, a long-run equilibrium is achieved in t = 2 in which st = b e0 and vt =

b e0 2 (vcc;v]
for all t = 2;:::;1.
Proposition 1 argues that from any initial stock of educated parents (that cannot be too
small, or the economy would immediately die out of starvation) the economy converges to a
long-run equilibrium, and that there is a one-to-one mapping between the initial stock and the
type of long-run equilibrium that is converged to. There are two, quite distinct types of long-run
equilibria. One one hand, there is unique \good" long-run equilibrium in which all and only the
talented agents go to school, and the skilled wage is relatively low. This is an equilibrium in
18which credit constraints are not binding, and talent is eciently allocated to the skilled labor
force. On the other hand, there is a whole class of \bad" long-run equilibria in which all and
only the ospring of skilled workers go to school, and the skilled wage is relatively high. In these
equilibria credit constraints are binding for a fraction of the population, and the allocation of
talent to the skilled labor force is inecient. Intuitively, the ospring of unskilled workers cannot
aord to go to school if v > vcc, while the ospring of skilled workers can. This implies that
it will be only the ospring as skilled workers to go to school for v > vcc. Furthermore, since
vcc > 2, it will be all of them to go to school, creating an equilibrium in which the skilled labor
force self-perpetuates itself over time.18 The only upper constraint on this class of equilibria is
that v cannot be greater than v, or the economy would collapse.19
Figure 1 illustrates convergence to the long-run equilibrium from any share of educated par-
ents e0. Because the working decisions of young agents do not aect the short-run equilibrium in
period 1, we can treat v1 as exogenous to the schooling decisions of generation 1. The left-hand
panel represents the case in which v1  vcc. In this case, no one is credit constrained in period
1. Because of rational expectations and certainty, this implies that the skilled labor supply in
t = 2 will include all of the talented agents of generation 1 if v2 > 2
, all of generation 1 if v2 > 2.
Under Assumption 1, demand and supply meet in the rst vertical portion of the supply sched-
ule. Thus, the short-run equilibrium in period 2 is such that all and only the talented agents go




 < vcc by Assumption 2, this is also a long-run
equilibrium (the \good" equilibrium described in Proposition 1).
The right-hand panel represents the case in which v1 > vcc. In this case, the ospring of
skilled workers are the only ones who can go to school in period 1. The supply of skilled labor in
period 2 is then everywhere lower than in the previous case, reecting the fact that schools can
only collect their intake from a portion e0 < 1 of the population. There are then two distinct
cases. If educated parents in period 1 are not too few, supply of skilled labor in period 2 is
18Notice that we could relax Assumption 2 to vcc >

. This would imply a slightly more complicated
transitional dynamics for the case in which v1 2 (vcc;2], but not change the result that the economy converges
to one of the \bad" long run equilibria when v1 > vcc.
19Notice that the cost of subsistence ranges from 1
2 to 1 as v ranges from vcc to v. For these high values of
the cost of subsistence, unskilled parents bequeath less than a share 1
2 of their second period's income to their
ospring. This does matter for our result, however, as these ospring would have been credit constrained anyway
































Case 2: v1 > vcc
Figure 1: Long-run equilibria in autarchy
not too low (ss
2 schedule), and v2  vcc. Because credit constraints are not binding in period 2,
supply in period 3 (ss
3 schedule) is identical to supply in the right-hand panel, and the economy
converges to the good long-run equilibrium in period 3. If instead there are very few educated
parents and v2 > vcc ((ss
2)0 schedule), credit constraints are still binding in period 2, and the
ospring of skilled workers are again the only ones that can go to school. Because v1 > vcc and
v2 > 2, the number of skilled workers in t = 2 must be the same as in t = 1. It follows that the
supply of skilled labor in t = 3 ((ss
3)0 schedule) will be identical to supply in t = 2, and a \bad"
long run equilibrium is reached.
Having found all the possible long-run equilibria at which H can be in autarchy, we next
move to consider how the long-run equilibrium of this country may be aected by opening up to
trade with a foreign country.
6 Trade equilibrium
We now introduce a foreign country, F, and study the eect of trade on the skill premium. Since
we are interested in explaining the eect of trade liberalization in relatively unskilled labor-
abundant Latin America, we want H to start out from a lower s than F. The simplest way to
obtain this in out framework is to assume that the two countries are identical, but H is initially
20at a bad long-run equilibrium while F is at the good long-run equilibrium. In this environment,
the only reason for trade between H and F is H being stuck at an equilibrium where all and
only the ospring of skilled workers can go to school, while in F school is open to all talented
agents independently on their social background. As a very rst approximation, this resonates
well with the very scarce social mobility of Latin America until the 1980s, at least relative to the
United States or Europe.
While we assume that the main dierence between H and F is the long-run equilibrium they
start out at, we also want to capture the fact that H may be more or less large relative to the
world it opens to. To that purpose, we parameterize the size of F by  > 1: more precisely, the
population of F has mass n. This formulation will allow us to consider various scenarios for
the impact of trade on prices in H. To the limit, for  ! 1 we will be considering the case in
which H is a small economy that opens to a world where prices are exogenously given. Apart
from the dierence in size, the two countries are identical in terms of preferences, technology
and distribution of talent. In what follows, we denote by small letters with the superscript (*)
the endogenous variables in F, by small letters without any super or sub-script the endogenous
variables in H, and by capital letters the common value prices when free trade occurs between
the two countries.
For simplicity, we chose to focus on the case in which trade equalizes the reward to factors
in the two countries (factor price equalization, FPE from now on).20 We show in Appendix B
that there exists an  2 [0;1) such that FPE obtains i  < . We thus impose:
Assumption 3  < , so that factor price equalization obtains.
In words, Assumption 3 requires that the two tradable sectors of the economy be dierent
enough in their skilled labor-intensity. Intuitively, if production of x was not enough unskilled
labor-intensive, the economy would not be able to absorb H's large unskilled labor force at the
higher relative cost of unskilled labor dictated by international trade. The economy would then
be forced to specialize in the production of x, and the relative reward to unskilled labor would
have to remain lower than in F.
20This is not necessary for our results: all we need is that trade decrease (increase) the relative skilled wage in
H (F), a result that holds independently on FPE.
216.1 Trade equilibrium with exogenous skilled labor
Before studying the eect of trade on schooling and working decisions, we investigate its eect
in the case of xed endowments. Suppose that the supply of skilled workers is exogenously given
at st and s
t in the two countries. Then, we show in Appendix B that opening up trade in period





















Comparing equations (12)-(15) to equations (1)-(4) reveals a very convenient fact: the com-
mon prices that realize in the two countries after trade is opened can be calculated as the
equilibrium autarchy prices of a hypothetical country created by combining the two countries'
labor endowments. This result (known in trade theory as the \integrated trade equilibrium"
result) only holds when FPE holds.
Looking at equation (12), we see that the skilled wage under free trade is always included
between

st (the autarchy skilled wage in H) and

s
t (the autarchy skilled wage in F), is strictly
decreasing in , and converges to

s
t as  goes to innity. This implies that trade increases the




t ) in H, decreases it in F. Not surprisingly, the pattern
of trade will then be that H (the unskilled labor-abundant country) export good x (the unskilled
labor-abundant good), in exchange for y. Notice that the absolute price of both x and y decreases
in H. This result is due to the fact that we have xed the level of the unskilled wage by adding
a constant-return-to scale, non-tradable sector (f). It is in line with the Stolper-Samuelson
prediction that the purchasing power of unskilled labor must increase in H, in terms of both
tradable goods.21
21Notice that the expansion of the x industry in H implies a re-allocation of labor from sector y to sector x in
this country. If ring costs prevented this reallocation, px and py would still fall in response to a cheaper supply
from F. The zero-prot condition would then require wages to fall as well. However since px must decrease less
22Anticipating our denition of the skill premium as the ratio of observed skilled to unskilled
wage (see Section 6.2 for more details), we notice that, in this model with exogenous endowments,
the opening up to trade must be associated with an increase of the skill premium in F and a
decrease in H. This is because trade increases the skilled wage in F and decreases in H (for
constant unskilled wage), while the average talent of the skilled labor force remains the same.
Thus, the simplied model fully satises the Stolper-Samuelson predictions for the impact of
trade on to skill premium. In the next section, we show that this does need to be the case after
endogeneizing the schooling and working decisions of agents.
6.2 Trade equilibrium with endogenous skilled labor
Before investigating the impact of trade on schooling and working decisions, we must specify the
timing of trade liberalization and its relations to agents' expectations. A full-edged analysis
of trade liberalization in a model with rational expectations would require to specify to what
extent trade liberalization at time t is foreseen by agents in previous periods. This is important
because, for example, the possibility of trade liberalization aects the expected skilled wage in t,
thus inuencing the schooling decisions at time t 1. While making the analysis more coherent,
to account for the expectation of trade liberalization would greatly complicate the model, as it
would link the autarchy equilibria of the two countries to each other even before trade is opened.
At the same time, this extension would not undermine the logic of our argument unless trade
liberalization is fully foreseen - a case that we consider unlikely. For these reasons, we choose
to model trade liberalization as a fully unexpected event in period t. To facilitate the intuition,
this simple model can be thought of as substantially equivalent to one in which trade is opened
in period t, and the probability perceived beforehand that this would happen was very low.
To introduce trade in our framework, we enrich the timing at period t (and at period t only)
by adding the following event:
t.0 Trade is opened (to remain open forever after).
than py (as this is the comparative advantage industry for F), the unskilled wage must, on average, decrease less
than the skilled wage. The basic results that trade decreases the credit constraints of the poor (see below) would
then be preserved.
23That is, trade is opened immediately before generation t is born in t:1, and remains open
forever after. At time t:2, educated parents decide whether to join the skilled labor force or
not. As in autarchy, this choice and the prices that form in period t:3 must constitute a short-
run equilibrium. Because conditions have unexpectedly changed, however, schooling decisions
in period t   1 need not be optimal anymore. In particular, it may well be the case that some
of the educated parents decide to stay out of the skilled labor force, as trade has depressed
the skilled wage to a level well below what they expected when they decided to go to school.
This misalignment between expected and real prices lasts for one period only. Because there
is no uncertainty after period t - trade remains forever open, and this is common knowledge -
generation t's schooling decisions must correctly reect prices as they will form under free trade
in period t + 1. Notice that trade aects the schooling decisions of generation t in two ways. It
may aect their participation constraints, by changing the level of the skilled wage in t+1; and
it may aect their credit constraints, by changing the level of the skilled wage in t.
Our rst result is presented in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that country H is at a bad long-run equilibrium while country F is at
the good long-run equilibrium. If trade between the two countries is opened in period t, and F is
large enough, both countries end up at the good long-run equilibrium in t + 1.
Proof. Distinguish two cases. If v
t 1  1, it is:
Vt =
(1 + )
(et 1)b  + 
:
Recall that Vt() is included between





skilled wage in F), is strictly decreasing in , and converges to

s
t as  goes to innity. . Because

 < vcc < vt 1, there exists a b  > 0 such that Vt < vcc if  > b . Since no one is credit
constrained for this level of the skilled wage, the supply of skilled labor in t+1 is equal to (10) in
both countries. This implies that the joint supply (as a share of the total population of parents),
is also equal to (10). Similarly, since demand for skilled labor (as a share of the total population
24of parents) is

Vt in both countries, the joint demand is also equal to

Vt. We can thus use a
procedure identical to that in the proof to Proposition 1 to show that a long-run equilibrium is
achieved in t + 1 whereby st+s = s
t+s =  and Vt+s =

 for all s = 1;:::;1.
If v
t 1 < 1, it is:
Vt =
8
> > > <
> > > :
(1+)
et 1b + > 1 if  < 





et 1+ < 1 if  > 
(16)
where   arg
n
(1+)
et 1b + = 1
o





. Since Vt has the same properties
as before (except that it is now weakly decreasing in ), there still exists a b  > 0 such that
Vt < vcc if  > b , and the proof can proceed as before.
Proposition 2 suggests that if H is at a bad long-run equilibrium and it opens up to a
relatively skill-abundant country (or rest of the to world), trade may trigger a mechanism that
shifts H to the good long-run equilibrium within a generation. The intuition for this result is
straightforward. Because F is relatively skilled labor-intensive, trade reduces the skilled wage
in H. Since v
t 1 < vcc, this reduction must be large enough to take the skilled wage below the
threshold vcc when F is large enough. But for Vt < vcc the ospring of unskilled workers are not
credit constrained anymore, and all of generation t's talented agents can choose to go to school
in period t. Furthermore, while the (expected) skilled wage has fallen relative to its pre-trade
level, it is still high enough to motivate all of these agents into school. Of course, this is only
possible because credit constraints, and not participation constraints, prevented these agents
from joining the skilled labor force in autarchy. On the contrary, the non-talented ospring of
skilled workers - that would have gone to school had the (expected) skilled wage remained at its
pre-trade level - are now better o opting out of the schooling system. It follows that all and
only the talented agents go to school after trade is opened, and the economy moves to the good
long-run equilibrium in period t + 1.22
The result that trade may move the unskilled labor-intensive country from a low human
22The spirit of the model would be preserved if red costs prevented (or slowed down) the reallocation of labor
from sector the x to sector y, because the average unskilled wage would still increase relative to the average
skilled wage (see also footnote 21).
25capital equilibrium to a high human capital equilibrium is very similar to the results found
by Ranjan (2003). More in general, that trade may lead to an increase in school enrollment
among the ospring of unskilled workers is a key result of the literature on trade with credit
market frictions and trade, beginning with Cartiglia (1997). These results are consistent with a
few recent empirical studies on the impact of trade liberalization on child labor. For example,
Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) nd that a trade-induced increase in the price of rise in Vietnam
was associated with a higher decrease in child labor in regions that were exposed to a higher
price change. Similarly, Kis-Katos and Sparrow (2009) exploits variation in the degree of trade
liberalization across Indonesian districts to argue that trade liberalization is associated with a
decrease in child labor, and that this eect is strongest for children from low-skill backgrounds.
We now turn to the main focus of the paper, which is to consider the consequences of trade
for the skill premium in both countries. To that purpose, we begin by dening the skill premium
in H in period t as:
t  (b S)tvt
where (b S)t denotes the average talent of members of H's skilled labor force in period t (the skill
premium in F is dened symmetrically as   (b 
S)tv
t). Following the empirical literature, we
dene the skill premium as the ratio of the average wage of members of the skilled labor force by
the average wage of the members of the unskilled labor force (which is always 1 in equilibrium),
not controlling for the unobservable talent of workers. We begin by considering the impact of
trade on the skill premium in the long-run (in period t+1 and after) and we will then comment
on its impact in the short-run (in period t).
The long-run eect of trade on the skill premium are described in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Suppose that trade is opened between H and F in period t, and this moves H to












26Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that, if  > b , it is Vt+s = v
t 1 and (b 
S)t+s = (b 
S)t 1 = 
for s = 1;:::;1. Thus, it must be the case that 
t+s = 
t 1 for s = 1;:::;1. As for H, we may
write:






since t 1 = b vt 1.
Proposition 3 studies the long-run eect of trade on the skill premia for the case in which
trade moves H to the good equilibrium (see Proposition 2). Not surprisingly, the long-run eect
of trade on the skill premium in F is none (
t+1 = 
t 1). This follows from the fact that skilled
wage goes back to its original value in this country, and agents' schooling and working decisions
remain unaected throughout the adjustment process. Intuitively, we are working with a model
where the only source of comparative advantage is the multiplicity of equilibria in the human
capital accumulation process. As suggested by Proposition 2, trade may have the eect of lifting
all trade participants to the same \good" equilibrium in the long run. When this is the case,
any eect of trade on the country that was at that equilibrium before trade liberalization (and
trade itself) must disappear in the long run.
More interestingly, proposition 3 suggests that the long-run skill premium in H is the product
of its pre-trade liberalization level and two distinct terms. The rst is the ratio of the level of
the skilled wage post-trade liberalization to its level pre-trade liberalization (
Vt+1
vt 1). Because H is
on the unskilled labor-abundant side of the trade relation, this ratio must be smaller than 1 in
equilibrium. Thus, the impact of trade on the skill premium as described by the rst term is just
as in a standard Stolper-Samuelson world: trade decreases the skill premium in the unskilled
labor-abundant country, because it decreases the skilled wage relative to the unskilled wage.
The second term in equation (17), however (
b ), introduces an important qualication to this
conclusion. The term captures the extent of talent re-allocation following to trade liberalization,
or alternatively the degree of talent misallocation in H before trade liberalization. Since  > b 
- trade always improves the allocation of talent to the skilled labor force - this term must be
greater than 1. Thus, the immediate gist of Proposition 3 is that the Stolper-Samuelson eect
on the skill premium is always moderated by the reallocation of talent. In Appendix D we show
27that it can actually be 
b  >
Vt+1
vt 1 in our parameter space, or that the Stolper-Samuelson eect
may be reversed when the initial degree of talent misallocation in H is large enough.23
We have thus found that in world with educational credit constraints, trade with a large
skill-abundant world will have a less negative, and possibly a positive eect on the long-run
skill-premium of a skill-scarce country. The intuition for this result is straightforward. By
increasing the real purchasing power of unskilled workers in terms of the tradable goods in the
economy, trade increases the capacity of the talented ospring of unskilled workers to pay for
their subsistence expenses when going to school. At the same time, by lowering the skilled wage
per eciency unit, trade discourages the non talented ospring of skilled workers to go to school
as they would have done in a pre-trade world. These two forces increase the average talent of
those rst in school after trade liberalization, leading to higher remunerations and possibly to a
reversal of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem.
It is important to notice that the increase in the skill premium after trade liberalization is only
possible if, for a given increase in the school enrollment of talented people, there is a suciently
large decrease in the school enrollment of non talented people. These opposite movements (in and
out of the schooling system) might explain why aggregate school enrollment increased relatively
little after trade liberalization in Latin America, while the skill premium increased signicantly.
This compares with the case of South-East Asia, where trade liberalization was followed by a
much more large increase in aggregate enrollment and by a decrease in the skill premium. This
latter pattern is consistent with the prediction of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and of our
model for the case in which the movement out of of the schooling system is very small relative
to the movement into the schooling system.
We next consider the eect of trade liberalization on the skill premium in the short run. This
is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Suppose that trade is opened between H and F in period t, and this moves H to
23In passing, we note that the eect of given reallocation of talent would be even stronger if productivity
depended on talent in the unskilled labor force as well, as an increase in the average talent of the skilled labor
force would then be accompanied by a decrease in the average talent in the unskilled labor force.















t 1  1, it is  = 1. Otherwise, it is  2 [1; 
b ], and  is monotonically increasing in the size
of F.
Proof. Since (b 
S)t 1 = (b 
S)t =  we can write:
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As for country H, we can always write:










t 1  1, it is always Vt > 1 and (b S)t = b : it follows that  = 1. If v
t 1 < 1, it is
Vt > 1, (b S)t = b  and  = 1 for  < , while it is Vt < 1, (b S)t =  and  = 
b  for  >  (see
equation 16). For  2 [;], it must be
(1+)
et 1(+ )+ = 1, where   is the number of non talented
parents that join the skilled labor force (as a share of the total number of educated parents), and
(b S)t =
+ 
+  . Since   is strictly decreasing in  and must range between 1  and 0 as  ranges
between  and , it follows that  is strictly increasing in  for  2 [;], and ranges between 1
and 
b  for  in this range.
Proposition 4 studies the short-run eect of trade on the skill premia, for the case in which
trade moves H to the good equilibrium. In other words, it studies the transitional dynamics of
the skill premia, before these converge to the values described in Proposition 3. The eect of
trade on the skill premium in F is unambiguously positive in the short run (since it is always
Vt
v
t 1 > 1). This is because trade increases the value of skilled labor in this country, while
the average composition of talent stays the same (as all educated parents are already part of
29the skilled labor force). Thus, although in this model F's skilled premium gets back to its
original level in the long-run, the transitional dynamics contains the standard features of a trade
liberalization for a skill-abundant country.
Just as in the long-run, our model may display non standard predictions for the impact of
trade on H's skill premium in the short run. Proposition 4 distinguish two cases. If v
t 1 < 1,
the eect of trade on the skill premium is unambiguously negative in the short run (since it is
always Vt
v
t 1 < 1).24 Intuitively, the trade-induced decrease in the skilled wage cannot be too large
in this case, and all educated parents must then remain in the skilled labor force. This implies
that the average talent in the skilled labor force does not change, and the skill premium must
then decrease. Thus, when H opens up to a world that is not too skill abundant, the Stolper-
Samuelson predictions are satised both in F and in H, since our talent-reallocation channel is
eectively shut down. If v
t 1 > 1, on the contrary, this channel can be fully at play. In particular,
when F is large enough, the extent of talent reallocation can be as high as in the long run (
b ).
This is for a partially dierent reason, however. In the short run, the initial misallocation of
talent can only be corrected through an exit of the non-talented educated parents from the skilled
labor force. This re-allocation is only partial, as all talented, non educated parents do not have
an option to join in. Because it increases the average talent of the skilled labor force, however,
this partial re-allocation obtains a very similar eect as the full re-allocation in the long run. In
fact, if F is large enough both eects push up the skill premium by the same amount 
b . Because
the decrease in the skilled wage is more modest in the short run ( Vt
vt 1 >
Vt 1
vt 1), the skill premium
will then increase in the short run whenever it does in the long run, and increase by more.25
Thus, we have shown that trade-induced compositional change may result in an increase in
the skill premium in the unskilled labor-abundant country, both in the short run and in the long
run. In the short run, the downward pressure put by trade on the skilled wage may induce the
least talented of the existing skilled workers to drop out of the skilled labor force, thus increasing
its average quality. When it happens in the short run, this compositional change always extends
24Notice that Assumptions 1 and 2 are compatible with the case

 < 1. For example, if  =

2 this result
holds for all  > 2.
25This outow of labor from the tradable sectors is consistent with evidence from Brazil suggesting that trade
liberalization induced labor displacement from the formal sector to the informal and self-employment sector (see
Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2007).
30to the long run, as only talented young agents nd it optimal to go to school after trade has
been opened. Even if it doesn't happen in the short run, however, this compositional change
may still realize in the long run. This is because non talented agents are more prone to joining
the unskilled labor force when they are young and unskilled, rather than when they are old and
already skilled.
In the short run, these results are associated with an increase in the skill premium in the
skilled labor-abundant country as well. Thus, our results are consistent with the fact that trade
between unskilled labor-intensive Latin America and various skilled labor-intensive parts of the
world results in an increase in the skill premium in both places. Because it preserve the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin structure in which the skilled wage per eciency unit decreases in H, our model
is also consistent with the nding that skill intensity in most Latin American industries increased
after trade liberalization. Finally, our results are also compatible with the observation that the
skill premium increased homogeneously across industries in skill-scarce countries, independently
on the degree of trade liberalization to which each industry had been exposed (see Attanasio,
Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2004, for the case of Colombia).
To better focus on our mechanism, we have set up a model where the only source of compar-
ative advantage is the dierent initial equilibria that countries nd themselves at. This simple
model displays several unrealistic features, such as the fact that trade disappears in the long
run and the skill premium in F goes back to its pre-trade value. Also, as a consequence of the
latter fact, the model can only generate a trade-induced increase in the skill premium in H when
H's pre-trade skill premium is higher than F's - a case that does not match the data well.26
To bring more \structural" sources of comparative advantage to the model would take care of
these problems. For example, we could allow for F's skill-intensive sector to benet from a bet-
ter technological or institutional environment, or from a better educational system. Consider a
straightforward example. Suppose that a better educational system maps into a larger proportion
of agents that can reach high productivity in F than in H (thus,  > ). In this environment, a
trade-induced shift of H to the good equilibrium does not equalize the stock of human capital in
26To see this, notice that it must be t+1 = 
t+1. If t+1 > t 1 and 
t+1 = 
t 1, it follows that t 1 < 
t+1.
This result is in contrast with evidence that the skill premium is generally higher in skill-scarce countries before
trade liberalization.
31the two countries. Positive trade will then be a feature of the long-run equilibrium, allowing for
a common post-trade skill premium that is higher than F's pre-trade skill premium. In this case
the model may well predict an increase in the skill premium in both countries in the long run
as well. Furthermore, even if the common post-trade skill premium is higher than H's pre-trade
skill premium, it is then possible that the latter is higher than F's pre-trade skill premium.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model of trade liberalization and occupational choice, with capital
market imperfections. When an economy is unskilled labor-intensive because of credit constraints
that aect the schooling decisions of agents, trade liberalization may have a non-standard eect
on the skill premium. This is for two reasons. First, credit constraints may have allowed a
large number of non talented agents in the skilled labor force. Having been attracted to the
skilled labor force by a high autarchic skilled wage, these agents may nd it optimal to join the
unskilled labor force when trade puts a downward pressure on the skilled wage. Second, credit
constraints may have kept many talented agents out of the skilled labor force. To these agents,
a trade-induced decrease in the cost of subsistence implies a lessening of credit constraints, and
thus a better chance to move up the social scale. Both of these eects result in an increase in
the average talent of the skilled labor force, which may lead to an increase in the skill premium
despite the trade-induced decrease in the skilled wage.
Our results provide a possible explanation for the fact that trade liberalization in unskilled
labor-intensive Latin America led to an increase in the skill premium in both Latin America
and its skilled-intensive trade partners. One implication of this is that the increase in the
skill premium in Latin America does not necessarily need to result in a massive increase in
income inequality, as it may be (at least partly) due to a better allocation of talent and more
intergenerational mobility.
While reconciling the predictions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem with the Latin American
experience, our mechanism is not incompatible with alternative explanations that have high-
lighted the role of skill-biased technical change or of quality upgrading. In fact, one interesting
32extension of our model is to consider the interaction of talent re-allocation with these other
trade-induced changes in the structure of production. Other needed extensions include study-
ing our mechanism in the context of more structural sources of comparative advantage (such as
dierences in physical capital, quality of schooling, etc.), and letting the decisions of agents be
aected by the wealth distribution.
Appendices
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Provided that all agents can aord to spend  on good z, the autarchy equilibrium is dened






























where we have replaced market clearing with the corresponding zero-prot condition in sectors
displaying both constant returns to scale and a positive demand (in the f sector, also all individual
33demands are positive by assumption), and we have dropped the equations for the z and U
markets. Replacing x =
n
px and y =
n













































































































































where equation (34) is the balanced trade condition for country H. Assume factor price equal-
ization. Then w = 1 and v = v = V , implying that p
f = 1 and p









































































Summing (38) and (39) and plugging in (36), (37), (40) and (41) yields V =
(n+n)
S+S
 . We now
need to make sure that x, x, y and y are positive. Using (38) together with (42) yields:




 + 1   2
1   2
(43)





where   sn+sn
s(n+n) and v is the pre-trade level of the skilled wage in H. Using symmetry we
then obtain:
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where   sn+sn
s(n+n) and v is the pre-trade level of the skilled wage in F. Several things are
apparent. First, if s = s,  =  = 1 for all n and n, and countries always produce their
autarchy level of x and y (and there is no trade). Second, if s > s,  > 1 >  > 1
2 for all
35n and n such that n  n, and H produces more x (less y) than in autarchy, thus exporting
(importing) this good. Finally, because   1 and  > 1
2, there exists  such that, if  > ,
production of both intermediates is positive in both countries (notice that b  ! 1 as  ! 0).
Notice also that, as  ! 0, production of y in country j converges to S
j
.
We conclude by checking that local demand for unskilled labor in the x and y sectors does
not exceed supply in H - the country where trade pushes up employment in the unskilled labor-
intensive sector:








Although trade with a skill-intensive partner soaks up additional unskilled labor to H's
tradable sectors relative to autarchy (where Ux+Uy = n), there will always be sucient supply
as long as  is small enough.
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i is level of talent of the parent of agent i. Because 
p
ivt > 1, condition (47) must hold







i (recall that it must be 
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), (47) must hold for any vt > vcc.
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(   1)2 + 
: (48)
36Since the RHS of (48) is decreasing in , we experiment by plugging in the lowest possible










(2 + )   
: (49)
The RHS of (49) ranges between 2 and 1 as  ranges between 1 and 1. Since vt 1 may take
value in (2;v], it may well be the case that condition (49) is satised.
E
Call mi
t;s the income of agent i in generation t. Because it must be mi
t;t >  in equilibrium (see
Section 3.2), the marginal utility of income in period t is 1. Assume now that u is low enough,
so that the survival constraint is not binding. Utility maximization then requires that mi
t;t+1 be
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